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"The Arab nation would not become the 'sick man' of this century." 
Egyptian President Husni Mubarak' 
A salient feature of the post-1967 period in the Arab world was the 
decline in the role played by Arab intellectuals. This process was accompanied 
by what Fouad Ajami described as "a definite backlash against the written 
word."2 One might assume that this phenomenon would also indicate the 
waning of ideology as a driving force in Arab politics. However, its centrality 
was still vividly displayed during the recent Gulf crisis (1990-91), when the 
Arab world witnessed, in addition to the actual fighting, a war-of-words 
between Saddam Hussein and his Arab opponents. While most studies hitherto 
published dealt with the political and military aspects of the Gulf crisis, this 
article attempts to shed light on a rather neglected aspect of the conflict: the 
ideological struggle between Arab states and leaders.3 
IDEOLOGY AND ITS FUNCTIONS 
The term "ideology" has more than one definition. David Easton defined it 
as "articulated sets of ideals, ends, and purposes, which help the members of the 
system to interpret the past, explain the present, and offer a vision for the future."4 
A somewhat similar definition was suggested by Alexander George for political 
ideology: "a set of fundamental beliefs . . . that explains and justifies a preferred 
political order for society... and offers at least a sketchy notion of strategy... for 
its maintenance or attainment."5 These definitions substantiate Clifford Geertz's 
assertion that the term itself has been thoroughly ideologized. For, while it had once 
meant "a collection of political proposals, perhaps somewhat intellectualistic and 
impractical but at any rate idealistic," the term has now become "the integrated 
assertions, theories, and aims constituting a politico-social program."6 Using 
Geertz' s terminology, John Thompson has recently suggested that ideology should 
be seen as "meaning in the service of power," and that to study ideology is "to study 
the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination."7 
A coherent ideology may contain several components: first, a normative 
concept established by "the identification and justification of the preferred order;" 
second, an explanatory dimension offering "an authoritative diagnosis of the ills 
and evils of the present political order," and the identification of the enemy; third, 
a prescriptive dimension defining a program and a general strategy for its realiza-
tion; and finally, a predictive dimension stating "the prospects for the eventual 
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realization of one's fundamental political values and ideological goals."8 Thus, 
ideology is a set of doctrines, beliefs and myths taken from the society's mythology 
and historiography.9 Having established its ideology, the regime uses propaganda 
—"the deliberately evoked and guided campaign to induce people to accept a given 
view"10 — in order to achieve its goals. 
Ideology may have several functions in any given society. First, leaders use 
it to justify their actions and policies before and ex post facto. ' ' Second, it is widely 
exploited as a legitimacy resource. Easton described this mode of ideology as 
"ethical principles that justify the way power is organized, used, and limited and that 
define the broad responsibilities expected of the participants in the particular 
political relationship."12 Third, ideology helps to unify the nation by giving the 
masses a sense of direction.13 All in all, ideology is an instrument for "securing 
popular support for the regime and the ruling groups as representing the 'true' will 
of the people."14 
The above-mentioned functions of ideology are part of what Geertz termed 
the "interest theory," whereby ideology is seen as a mask and a weapon, and the 
ideological pronouncements are analyzed within the context of a universal struggle 
for advantage and power. Karl Mannheim was the first to suggest that "the particular 
conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are skeptical of the 
ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or 
less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation."15 Geertz, however, 
suggested another approach to the study of ideology, which he identified as "the 
strain theory." According to this theory, ideology functions both as a symptom of, 
and a remedy to, society's diseases, while its expressions are seen within the context 
of a "chronic effort to correct sociopsychological disequilibrium." Though the two 
theories are not necessarily contradictory, Geertz claimed, the second was "more 
penetrating, less concrete, [and] more comprehensive."16 While not dismissing the 
interest theory, he emphasized the significance of the first: 
The view that social action is fundamentally an unending struggle for 
power leads to an unduly Machiavellian view of ideology as a form 
of higher cunning and, consequently, to a neglect of its broader, less 
dramatic social functions. The battlefield image of society as a clash 
of interests thinly disguised as a clash of principles turns attention 
away from the role that ideologies play in defining (or obscuring) 
social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social expectations, main-
taining (or undermining) social norms, strengthening (or weakening) 
social consensus, relieving (or exacerbating) social tensions.17 
Bom the interest and the strain theories are applicable to the Arab world. While Arab 
leaders often use ideology as a legitimacy resource to enhance their position, the 
response of the masses to the use of ideology should be analyzed in the context of 
the "response to strain."18 
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IDEOLOGY IN THE ARAB WORLD 
The propagation of ideology has played a significant role in Third World 
countries during the second half of this century. Ideology was a useful tool for 
societies that felt the need to change through modernization, and which aspired to 
transform their social and moral values.19 However, implanting new values in 
modernizing societies is problematic; "nowhere more so," asserted Michael Hud-
son, "than in the Arab world where the religious charater of society is so evident."20 
In the case of the revolutionary Arab regimes, he added, die ruling élite attempts to 
harmonize "religion and nationalism, kinship group and political movement, die 
legacy of me past and me promise of die future, die sacred and me secular, and die 
consummately and die instrumental."21 
In me absence of structural legitimacy in die Arab world, Hudson further 
argued, "ideological legitimacy assumes paramount importance almost by de-
fault."22 In his opinion, "if one were to measure frequency of symbols . . . such as 
Islam, Palestine, democracy, liberation, and social justice, in me public speeches of 
Arab leaders, it would... dwarf me discussion of policy alternatives, projects, and 
day-to-day politics."23 According to his findings, all Arab regimes exploit ideology 
in Üieir pursuit of legitimacy, but me revolutionary republics had magnified it into 
what David Apter called a "political religion."24 For tiiose regimes, Apter ex-
plained, "die working out of an ideology is a way of indicating me moral superiority 
of new ideas."25 
The Arab language plays a crucial role in shaping die nature of ideology in 
die Arab world. Arabic, as Hisham Sharabi correctiy observed, became "a most 
effective instrument of influence and persuasion," while me effect in public 
speeches is created "not so much by reasoning and explication as by repetition and 
intonation."26 Moreover, die development of a new language — "medial" Arabic 
— which was neimer rigidly classical nor fully colloquial, had facilitated commu-
nication in die media. Sharabi attached great significance to die rise of die new 
revolutionary regime in Egypt (July 1952), which made use of a combined spoken 
dialect and "medial" Arabic: 
This departure had tremendous impact on die masses who, addressed 
for die first time in Üieir own spoken language, felt an unprecedented 
kinship witii me new leadership. In tiiis sense die revolution itself 
brought mis new facility and ease to the Arabic language and enabled 
me rise of a truly mass press and popular literature. More important 
perhaps, it removed a profound psychological barrier separating die 
illiterate masses from die educated classes of society and created on 
me political plane a new sense of unity and belonging.27 
While intellectuals in die West have played a prominent role in shaping 
ideologies, in the developing countries die ruling elites usually have set die tone.28 
Thus, when analyzing ideology in the Arab world, special attention should be paid 
to political leaders' statements since tiiey tend to exert influence on die masses, and 
because tiiey have almost exclusive control over the communication apparatus.29 
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Egypt's successful use of ideology as a tool in its foreign policy led Arab 
leaders — like the Ba'th party leaders in Syria and Iraq — to imitate the Egyptian 
model. Like other Ba'thist revolutionaries, Saddam Hussein (who became the Iraqi 
president in 1979, but had been the regime's "strongman" long before that time) 
attached great significance to the role of ideology, though he himself carried "no 
ideological baggage."30 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi observed that for Hussein 
ideology "is purely a means for the promotion of the one and only goal:" reaching 
the country's top position and staying there.31 As a Ba' thist leader, Saddam Huseein 
attempted to buttress his legitimacy by promoting pan-Arab ideology (qawmiyya) 
and by portraying himself as a pan-Arab leader. At the same time, however, he 
attempted to create, sometimes to the extent of re-writing history, a new national 
Iraqi identity (wataniyya) based on the Mesopotamian past, that is, the ancient 
civilizations in the territory between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers.32 
Since Khomeini's revolution in 1979, the Ba'th secular-national ideology 
has been strongly challenged by the new Iranian Islamic regime. Attempting to 
counter this threat, Saddam Hussein placed more emphasis on Islam in his speeches, 
and depicted himself as a descendant of the Prophet and the fourth Caliph 'Ali.33 
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Hussein' s ideology became an eclectic amalgamation 
of Iraqi, pan-Arab and Islamic messages, intended to achieve a solid base of 
legitimacy in Iraq and throughout the Arab world. 
In his quest for legitimacy during the Gulf crisis, the Iraqi leader employed 
all the ideological paraphernalia at his disposal. Though there was nothing innova-
tive in his messages, the intensity and the volume of their use were indeed new. 
Hussein' s exploitation of ideology should not lead us to regard it as a mere "jumble 
of rhetorical phrases and slogans," in Yehoshafat Harkabi' s words.34 Rather, his use 
of ideology and the war of words that followed it may reflect a deeper crisis in Arab 
thought and action. 
Hussein employed five major themes which will be the focus of this article: 
Islam; pan-Arabism; imperialism and Zionism; social and economic justice; and the 
question of "historical rights." Each ofmese will be examined in turn. The article 
will then offer some general conclusions regarding the utility and effectiveness of 
ideology in the Gulf crisis. 
ISLAMIC SYMBOLS 
Three holy places for the Arabs and Muslims are occupied: Jerusalem, 
Mecca, and the Prophet Muhammad's tomb.... Is there anything that 
is more humiliating, unjust and aggressive than this to mobilize and 
reactivate the resources of Arabs and Muslims? 
Saddam Hussein35 
Analyzing Saddam Hussein's pronouncements shows that the most sus-
tained effort in his propaganda campaign was directed to mobilize Islamic public 
opinion by using Islamic messages and citing Qura'anic verses.36 He presented 
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himself as a descendant of the Qurayshi tribe, maintaining that his family lineage went 
back to Hussein, the son of 'Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law.37 This mode of 
legitimation, was intended to create "a sense of belonging to a community and to a 
history which transcends the experience of conflict, difference and division."38 By 
using this strategy, the secular Iraqi leader attempted to project himself as a religious 
leader and thereby acquire the support of all Muslims, including the Iraqi Shi'ites, who 
consider 'Ali to be the Prophet's legitimate successor. 
At the beginning of the crisis, Hussein called upon the Muslims, "the 
grandchildren of the first al-Qadisiyah, Yarmuk and Hittin (batdes in Islamic 
history)," to declare jihad in order "to save Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet." He 
emphasized that the rulers of Najd and Hijaz (he refused to use the term 'Saudi 
Arabia,' thus implying his reluctance to recognize die Saudi state), had challenged 
God by placing the holy shrines "under foreign protection." Hence, it was the 
believers' duty to rise against the infidels and defend the holy places, which were 
"the captive of the spears of the Americans and Zionists." Iraq, Saddam concluded, 
would declarejihad without any hesitation or fear of the enemy.39 The call forjihad, 
usually aimed at rescuing Jerusalem and Palestine, was now directed to the three 
holy shrines which were "under occupation."40 Saddam's call was endorsed by an 
Islamic congress held in Iraq on 10 August, by the Iraqi National Assembly and by 
the Iraqi 'ulama. Significantly, the Grand Shi'i Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Kho'i 
issued afatwa (a religious ruling opinion) forbidding "seeking support from heretics 
against Muslims."41 His repeated call for jihad was directed to all Muslims, because 
"die humiliation... is not only directed against 200 million Arabs... but also against 
1 billion Muslims."42 
In contrast to his usual bellicose terminology, Hussein offered, in a symbolic 
gesture in honor of die Prophet's birthday anniversary in early October, a peaceful 
solution to the crisis.43 He also reverted to the common comparison between Israel 
and the Crusader Kingdom, which furnished his argument with an historical depth. 
Thus, he tried to turn the Iraqi-Kuwaiti episode into another clash in the battle 
between die Christian-West and die Muslim-Arab-East.44 As the UN deadline for 
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was approaching (15 January 1991), Saddam 
convened a garnering of die Popular Islamic Conference (PIC) on 9-11 January, 
which called on all Muslims to rise up in jihad should Iraq be attacked.43 On 14 
January, he ordered the redesigning of die Iraqi flag so as to include a drawing of 
the Islamic verse allahuakbar.46 Two days later, he addressed a letter to President 
Bush, loaded with Islamic verses and messages, which declared Iraq's willingness 
and readiness to fight against the "atheist" enemy.47 
The invasion of Kuwait posed serious questions to 'ulama and ordinary 
Muslims alike: Was it permissible, according to the Shari'a, for one Muslim state 
to conquer anodier? Was it appropriate for a Muslim-Arab state to seek the support 
of an "infidel state" against anodier Muslim-Arab state? The Iraqi answer was that 
according to die Shari'a, a Muslim is not allowed to look for infidel assistance 
against other Muslims.48 The invasion caused much confusion among 'ulama and 
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Islamic organizations, which responded according to their own state's interests and 
thus opened a "war offatwas." The Saudi Council of Higher 'Ulama issued afatwa 
supporting the presence of Arab, Islamic and "other friendly forces," and justifying 
Saudi Arabia's right to defend itself "by all possible means."49 Moreover, an Islamic 
conference, convened in Mecca on 13 September, denounced ihefitna (dissension) 
in the Gulf, called for Iraq's withdrawal, and reiterated the Saudi right to ask for 
foreign help.50 Saudi Arabia also convened in Mecca a gathering of the PIC on the 
precise dates of the Iraqi PIC gathering, with the participation of Egypt's Shaykh 
al-Azhar and other prominent 'ulama. Not surprisingly, the Mecca conference 
criticized the Baghdad meeting and declared that the invasion of Kuwait "violated 
the very principles of Islam."51 
The Egyptian regime also used the religious establishment to denounce the 
Iraqi invasion. Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jad al-Haqq, labeled Saddam 
"the Iraqi tyrant" (baghi) and brushed aside his Islamic pretensions as a cover for 
tyranny.52 The Egyptian Mufti, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, also issued afatwa 
allowing believers to use arms against the Iraqi leader.53 Some Islamic journals 
condemned Saddam Hussein, claiming that "never in the history of Islam and the 
Muslims had someone committed such an obscene crime." Hussein' s behavior was 
equated with mat of al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf, the ruthless Iraqi ruler during the Umayyid 
period.54 The use of Islamic symbols was not solely confined to religious circles; 
in a speech delivered at al-isra' wal-mi'raj (commemorating Muhammad's mid-
night journey to the seventh heaven), Egyptian President Husni Mubarak claimed 
that Saddam's call for a jihad was illegitimate, because it was not a defensive war, 
preemptive war or liberation war, which were considered legitimate causes for a 
jihad.55 The Egyptian press often termed Hussein "the Hulego of the Arabs," 
referring to the Mongol ruler who had destroyed Baghdad in 1258.56 The famous 
Egyptian writer Naguib Mahfuz argued that the Iraqi invasion was "a crime of the 
Jahiliyya" (the pre-Islamic era of darkness), which reflected the ineptitude of 
Islamic education.57 Even Syria, a country controlled by an Alawite minority 
accused of heresy, ridiculed Hussein's use of Islamic symbols.58 
Different responses came from Islamic movements in Jordan and in Algeria, 
as well as from organizations throughout the Islamic world, especially in India and 
Pakistan. The Jordanian media, constantly supporting Iraq, called the foreign troops 
"the new crusaders." The Jordanian minister for religious affairs stated that the 
fatwa of the Egyptian Mufti was "wicked, erroneous, and smacked of oil," and called 
"to expel the crusaders from the Arabian Peninsula."59 In a communiqué issued at 
the end of a meeting between the Jordanian and Algerian parliamentary delegations, 
it was stated that the foreign intervention was "an unprecedented humiliation," and 
that "any attack against Iraq would be considered an attack against the entire Islamic 
and Arab nation."60 A Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official was even 
more outspoken, claiming that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was "a religious duty," 
since "there should be no borders within the [Islamic] nation." Moreover, he 
asserted that, as unity must be acquired by all means, Hussein should be approached 
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and asked "to unify the Islamic ranks just as Salah al-Din had done during the time 
of the crusaders."61 During the war, as masses demonstrated in favor of Iraq, a leader 
of the Islamic movement in Algeria, Shaykh 'Abdullah Jaballah, rejected the 
Egyptian fatwa, repeating the Iraqi version that a Muslim cannot be assisted by a 
heretic.62 It must be emphasized, however, that some of the Islamic fundamentalist 
organizations, including the Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian 
Hamas, displayed some "understandable hesitancy" in their position, as they were 
financially dependent upon Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.63 The position of 
Hamas was particularly ambivalent because Hussein was supported by its rival, the 
secular PLO. 
PAN-ARAB TERMS 
"This is the battle of the entire Arab nation. It is not the battle of the 
Iraqis alone. Iraq is only the scene of the battle." 
Saddam Hussein64 
Despite the decline of pan-Arabism after 1967, Hudson has argued mat all-
Arab symbols and concerns remained central in "the legitimacy equation."65 Indeed, 
Saddam Hussein made frequent use of pan-Arab messages, and he emphasized Iraq's 
historical duty in the Arab world. These themes became even more explicit during the 
Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war. In the former, Hussein presented Iraq as the defender 
of the Arab world against the "foreign" Persians.66 Likewise, the Iraqi march into 
Kuwait was portrayed as the first step on the road to Arab unity. The annexation was 
nothing but a "merger" with "the motherland," which had been completed according 
to the wishes of the local inhabitants. The merger was "a new historical juncture," and 
a new launching base for the Arabs on the road of "unity, progress and liberation, under 
the historic brave leader, Saddam Husayn, the symbol of the nation's might and 
glory."67 In an open letter to the Egyptian president, Saddam reiterated that "the Arab 
nation is a single nation [and] that the Arab homeland from the Atlantic Ocean to the 
Arabian Gulf is a single homeland."68 On another occasion, he claimed that "the Arabs 
now face the inevitable restoration of the historical role which God has wanted for 
them."69 Taha Yassin Ramadan, Hussein's deputy, virtually admitted that Iraq 
conquered Kuwait; but in his opinion, it was a necessary step if the Arab nation wanted 
to eliminate a backward reality of schism and inability to cope with modem 
challenges. Furthermore, he saw the invasion as "a beginning of a national awakening 
in the Arab world."70 Hussein indicated that while Iraq had undertaken the Kuwaiti 
venture alone, the liberation of "the land" (i.e. Saudi Arabia) from "foreign occupa-
tion" was an all-Arab mission.71 Thus, the Iraqi president tried to convince the Arab 
masses that the takeover was in accordance with the aims of pan-Arabism, associated 
in the Arab mind with Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and his movement. 
His success in evoking the concept of Arab unity threatened to erode the 
legitimacy of the Arab states and to jeopardize their territorial integrity. In an 
emergency summit convened on 10 August in Cairo, the Egyptian president 
responded by offering his interpetration: 
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... [T]he concept of the [Arab] nation requires that we recognize first 
and foremost that all Arab countries occupy the same status in the 
general Arab framework. All Arab countries constitute equal links in 
the chain of the Arab family regardless of the dimensions of their 
human, material or military power, for the true power is that of the 
combined Arab nation and not that of one side or another, or the power 
of one state at the expense of another. Without agreement on this, we 
do not have me right to use the term Arab nation.72 
Mubarak indicated that if the goal of Arab unity was a precious objective, then it was 
desirable to define methods and guidelines which would serve as a basis for 
achieving the unity through gradual steps. "It is no longer permissible," continued 
the Egyptian president, "to achieve unity by force of arms, as was the case in the 
past." In his opinion, die principle of resorting to force wimin the Arab household 
"completely obliterates the concept of Arab solidarity and kills the idea of die 
common interests and destiny." Moreover, since regional politics cannot be 
divorced from global politics, the Arabs should be guided by the values of die 
international community, primarily "me abandonment of me use of force, rejection 
of aggression, respect for human rights, and commitment to legitimacy." Wim 
relation to the foreign troops, Mubarak emphasized that "die Arab umbrella"—die 
sending of Arab forces to me Gulf— constituted me best option for me Arab nation 
to emerge from die crisis intact." 
The Egyptian press fiercely attacked Saddam's attempts to cover his per-
sonal ambitions witii an Arab disguise. The editor of al-Ahram, Ibrahim Nafi', 
wrote that Iraq suddenly turned "from the state defending the eastern gate of the 
Arab nation, to a state which kills me Arab honor by attacking its neighbors."74 
Mustafa Amin wrote in al-Akhbar that Hussein's aspiration to become "the Arab 
Napoleon" (a term formerly used by king Sa'ud to depict 'Abd al-Nasir in me mid-
1950s) would result in me devastation of Iraq in a defeat resembling "June 5th," thus 
inflicting shame and humiliation on the Arab nation.75 Different terms were used 
in me Egyptian press to describe Saddam: "me Arab dictator," "die tiiief of 
Baghdad," or "me Hider of die Arabs."76 Bodi die Saudi and Syrian press ridiculed 
his attempt to unify die Arab world; in tiieir opinion, die annexation of Kuwait 
weakened die Arab position, while Israel consolidated its ranks since its strength 
"emanates from Arab divisions."77 An organ of die Saudi royal house also 
emphasized that "an occupation is an occupation whether an Arab or an Israeli."78 
The dieme of "Arab unity by force" struck a responsive chord among die 
Jordanian and Palestinian publics, however. According to al-Bayadir al-Siyasi, 
published in East Jerusalem, die struggle was between "die historical Arab legiti-
macy" and "die Imperialist Arab legitimacy." The paper argued mat Arab unity 
should be imposed by force, just like Bismarck unified Germany. Such unity would 
also solve die economic problems of the Arab world.79 These ideas were also voiced 
during die Amman convention, held on 16-18 September 1990, by one hundred 
leaders and representatives of different movements and organizations diroughout 
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the Arab world. The delegates finally declared, inter-alia, that the foreign interven-
tion in the Gulf was intended "to block the historic movement towards [the 
realization of] Arab unity - a program [for] which Iraq has been intensely [working] 
in the aftermath of the Gulf War [the Iran-Iraq war]."80 
IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM AND THE LIBERATION 
OF PALESTINE 
We all remember how our [Arab] nation suffered from foreign 
occupation during the last decades, and how we struggled to liberate 
ourselves from its yoke. After all these years, and after this long battle 
should we come and say openly to the world that we can not solve our 
problems, thus give it the opportunity to impose its hegemony? 
King Hussein81 
Since the formation of the Arab states at the end of World War I, Arab 
leaders and intellectuals have claimed that the Arab world had been partitioned 
into separate artificial entities according to the political and economic interests of 
the Western powers. Saddam Hussein constantly invoked this theme in order to 
emphasize that Kuwait was established due to the interests of "Western imperi-
alism." Moreover, he warned, behind the mask of "liberating Kuwait," the 
superpowers were eagerly waiting to resubjugate the Arab world.82 According to 
the Iraqi president, Zionist Israel, a stronghold of "Western imperialism" in the 
Middle East, had to be liberated if one wanted to evict "Western imperialism" 
from the area.83 At the Arab summit, Ramadan claimed that British colonialism 
intentionally separated Kuwait from Iraq in order to prevent the latter from 
defending itself. He often repeated the terms "collusion," "aggression" and 
"conspiracy," referring to a tripartite plot between the United States, Israel and 
Kuwait against Iraq.84 The Iraqi media also emphasized that the deployment of 
foreign troops at "Najd and Hijaz" was part of an "imperialist-Zionist con-
spiracy," assisted by "the betrayal of the two mosques" (thereby paraphrasing 
King Fahd's title as "defender of the two noble mosques").85 Furthermore, 
President Hussein astutely linked the issue of Iraq's presence in Kuwait to the 
Israeli occupation of Arab lands, when he suggested that all questions of 
occupation should be resolved in accordance with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions.86 
On 3 August 1990, the emergency session of the Arab League denounced 
Iraq's invasion, called for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal, but rejected 
outside interference.87 Feeling itself in imminent danger, Saudi Arabia decided to 
invite American troops to the Gulf, thus forcing the Arab leaders to take a stand. The 
Cairo summit agreed to dispatch Arab forces to the Gulf and implicitly recognized 
the Gulf states' right to seek foreign assistance.88 However, even Arab leaders who 
agreed with the foreign presence felt obliged to mitigate the impression of having 
collaborated with the West against a "sister" Arab state. Undoubtedly, the hated 
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memories of Western colonialism in the Middle East greatly contributed to Saddam 
Hussein's ability to mobilize Arab leaders and masses. Egypt, for example, 
allegedly rejected an American request to place military forces on its territory.89 
Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid announced that the task of the Egyptian 
forces would be to deter an attack against the Saudi kingdom, and that they "will not 
have any relationship with the foreign troops."90 The Egyptian press found 
similarities between the evacuation agreement signed by 'Abd al-Nasir with Britain 
in 1954 and the Saudi invitation of foreign forces.91 The apologetic attitude of the 
Egyptian establishment was manifested in an open letter from the editor of al-
Ahram to Saddam Hussein, which stated, inter alia, that "Egypt would be the first 
... to demand the evacuation of the foreign forces when you [Saddam] pull out your 
forces from Kuwait."92 
The apologetic attitude was even more apparent in the Saudi stance; during 
the Cairo summit, King Fahd expressed his willingness to accept any assistance — 
foreign or Arab—to defend his kingdom. These forces, he added, would withdraw 
from the Gulf as soon as the crisis was over or upon Saudi request. The king 
emphasized that "no attack [on Iraq] would be made from Saudi territory," 
justifying his move by Hussein's untrustworthiness — after all he had promised 
Mubarak that Iraq would not invade Kuwait.93 Syria adopted a more sophisticated 
position; President Asad claimed that while he categorically rejected the presence 
of foreign troops on Arab soil, the Iraqi invasion posed a more imminent threat to 
the Arab world. Once it was solved, he stressed, the question of foreign intervention 
also would wither away. In regard to the Palestine problem, Asad stated that, "the 
struggle for Palestine does not begin in Kuwait," and there "could not be a more far-
fetched site from which to launch the battle for the liberation of Palestine."94 
Interestingly enough, Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qaddhafi adhered to the 
Syrian position.95 Kuwait's position was firm and clear: in a speech to the summit, 
the Amir stated that if the conference failed to check Iraqi aggression, "our duty 
to our people, and our responsibility to God, would compel us to take whatever 
steps needed to liberate our country."96 His foreign minister was even quoted as 
having said that Kuwait would be willing to cooperate with the devil in order to 
expel the aggressor.97 
The Iraqi stance concerning the "artificial" Arab states was supported by 
many Arab leaders and organizations. King Hussein of Jordan forcefully claimed 
that the underlying cause of the crisis was the question of borders, which divided the 
Arab homeland into separate entities.98 At the end of the summit, Hussein clarified 
his view that "die Arabs reject the attempts to regain Western hegemony over the 
region and its resources," and that he refused to take part in the Arab force as long 
as Western troops were on Saudi soil.99 Likewise, the Jordanian press portrayed the 
crisis as a pretext for the United States to invade the region—an event which would 
lead to a "new era of Western colonialism."100 Amman hosted a gathering of leaders 
and representatives of Arab organizations with the aim of creating a unified 
movement against die foreign involvement. This move was intended to demonstrate 
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mat the Gulf crisis was in fact a struggle over the question of "Arab sovereignty."10' 
The conference's communiqué stated that "the American-imperialist invasion was 
not a response to 2 August, but another link in the chain of the historic struggle 
between our Arab nation and the imperialist West which also included the creation 
of the racist Zionist state at the heart of our homeland."102 One of the resolutions was 
"to strike against American interests everywhere," especially if the United States 
attacked Iraq.103 
The PLO and the Islamic organizations were unified in their opposition to the 
American "invasion." PLO chairman Yasser 'Arafat saw the Western involvement 
as a new "crusade."104 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and 
the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) condemned the 
American "military invasion into the Arab land."105 The PFLP went even further 
and called for the escalation of the intifada as a response to "the conspiracy."106 
Other Arab leaders, including the presidents of Algeria, Sudan and Yemen de-
nounced the presence of foreign troops in the Gulf, claiming that their goal was to 
defend Western interests in the region.107 Even the Egyptian opposition, sharply 
divided on the Kuwaiti crisis, denounced the foreign presence and described the 
conflict as "a quarrel within the family."108 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RICH AND POOR ARAB STATES 
Kuwait's liberation and its merger with its mother Iraq, has become 
the battle of the Arabs as a whole. It is a battle of liberation from 
hunger and want, the battle of starting a decent, prosperous life 
without humiliation and servility. 
Saddam Hussein109 
The main argument in this theme was the need to close the economic and 
social gap that exited between rich and poor states in the Arab world. An offshoot 
of the "imperialist" theme, this argument was used by both leaders and intellectuals 
against Western powers and their "local" lackeys, who created a deep gap between 
big-poor and small-rich countries while establishing the artificial Arab states. 
Saddam Hussein elaborated on this même by claiming that the Western powers had 
intentionally set up the "dwarf oil states" in order to prevent the Arab nation from 
enjoying its vast oil resources. In his view all Arabs should enjoy this wealth and 
not only a "tyrannical elite," which invested, according to his figures, $220 billion 
outside the Arab homeland. The "corrupted statelets," he continued, contaminated 
the elites of the big Arab countries, which in turn "spread the disease among the 
ranks of the majority."110 Saddam further declared that the Western powers added 
insult to injury by providing the oil wealth to a minority which lacked in "cultural 
depth," while "cultural depth and population density centered in a place remote 
from the sources of the new wealth."111 
The Iraqi leader accurately sensed that the Gulf states felt threatened by his 
policy, as they had formerly been intimidated by 'Abd al-Nasir who saw Gulf region 
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oil as a source of "pan-Arab wealth." On 10 September, Hussein announced his 
willingness to provide free oil to Third World countries if they would be responsibile 
for its shipping.112 Undoubtedly, the Iraqi aim was to undermine the Western 
economic blockade; however, Hussein presented it as an Iraqi gesture intended to 
redistribute Arab wealth. 
His declared willingness to redistribute Arab wealth did not deceive other 
Arab leaders. After all, Iraq had been as rich as Kuwait, but its revenues were spent 
during the Iran-Iraq war as a consequence of its "adventurist bankrupt policy.""3 
However, Hussein' s call struck a responsive chord among the Arab masses who felt 
exploited throughout die Arab world. Indeed, few could deny that the gap between 
the haves and have-nots was constantly widening, and that most of the revenues of 
the rich Arab states were being invested in the West and not in the Arab world."4 
Even so, the Egyptian establishment scorned the Iraqi claim; Mubarak, in a speech 
to the 3rd Armoured division leaving for the Gulf, stated that the "redistribution of 
wealth" was only an Iraqi ploy aimed at seizing the oil wells."5 The Egyptian 
newspaper al-Ahram ironically asked how "the pillage of a whole state by an armed 
force" could lead to the redistribution of wealth.116 Egypt considered the Iraqi 
suggestion a "poor bribe" offered by someone who had never given anything for 
free.117 Saudi Arabia and die Gulf states vehemently criticized Iraq and its allies 
(especially die PLO) for their attitude, claiming that die latter showed no gratitude 
after tiiey had been generously financed during the 1980s.118 Jordan was the only 
Arab state to publicly support Hussein's initiative, perceiving it as a sincere 
manifestation of die Arab nation's moral values.119 
RE-WRITING HISTORY: THE CLAIM OF "HISTORICAL RIGHTS" 
The small village which over die past two centuries was established 
on me shores of me Arabian Gulf and called Kuwait - an Iraqi word 
meaning 'die small populated colony' - was, during the 19tii century 
and until before die outbreak of WWI, a district belonging to me al-
Basra Governate and a part of Iraq in accordance witii die administra-
tive laws set by die Ottoman Empire at tiiat time.120 
Saddam Hussein , like otiier Iraqi rulers mat preceded him, believed mat 
Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq, because it had allegedly been part of die 
Ottoman Vilayet (Province) of Basra, which had become part of die new Iraqi state 
in 1921. In a letter to me American and Soviet presidents, Tariq 'Aziz added an 
annex which reviewed Iraq's historical claim to Kuwait.121 In addition, Iraqi 
editorials often used platitudes like "die return of Kuwait to its motiierland," or "die 
branch returned to its root and die family is reunited," stating tiiat Iraq would not 
leave Kuwait "even if it were to fight a tiiousand years."122 Furthermore, "historical" 
studies were published which validated Hussein' s assertion mat Kuwait was indeed 
a part of Iraq, and mat me Kuwaiti ruling family was not actually Arab. The Iraqi 
press announced me publication ofbooks, such as: The Iraqi Identity of Kuwait; The 
End of Partition: A Historical Study of the return of Kuwait district to Iraq; and, The 
Liquidated Regime of the House ofSabah.123 
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Hussein's attempt at re-writing Iraq's history is not new; his previous 
endeavors to associate modern Iraq with ancient Mesopotamian cultures was 
received with mixed emotions in Iraq.124 However, in contrast to his partial success 
in using Islamic and Arab messages during the Gulf crisis, the "historical rights" 
claim failed to attract Arab support. The negative response did not necessarily 
emanate from the assumed falsity of the Iraqi claim,125 but rather from its possible 
adverse ramifications upon the status-quo in the Arab world. The Egyptian press 
• emphasized that if Iraq had enjoyed historical rights over Kuwait, then Egypt could 
demand Libya, Syria, Sudan and the Hijaz—all of which were under Egyptian rule 
during the reign of Muhammad 'Ali in the first half of the nineteenth century.'26 
Moreover, both the Egyptian and Saudi press frequently voiced their concern that 
the annexation of Kuwait on the illegal basis of "historical rights" would stiffen 
Israel's resolve to retain Judea and Samaria.127 
CONCLUSIONS 
In his remarkable book on Arab politics, Michael Hudson concluded that 
ideology "has tended to wane with the slowing of revolutionary momentum."128 Yet 
the recent Gulf crisis showed that ideology still plays a prominent role in Arab 
politics, especially among the so-called "revolutionary regimes." Saddam Hussein 
employed various themes which were all too familiar in Arab politics, but which 
could still stir Arab emotions. While the era of Arab "ideological politics" has 
indeed withered away, the use of ideology by Arab leaders in their pursuit of 
legitimacy and power still widely prevails.129 
Hussein's success, limited as it was, revealed that most of the issues he had 
raised — Islam, Arab unity, social justice, the struggle against imperialism (linked 
to Zionist Israel), and the question of the Arab historical boundaries — found a 
receptive audience and were useful enough in mobilizing Arab public opinion. By 
using Ulis eclectic amalgamation of ideas, Saddam was able to accommodate the 
message to the audience. In other words, Saddam's conquest of Kuwait, as Fouad 
Ajami acutely observed, "offered something for nearly all the frustrated masses."130 
The use of ideology by Arab leaders during the Gulf crisis was neither 
sincere nor coherent. Moreover, the ideology — whether used by Hussein or his 
opponents — never became an operative reality, for the messages were not 
translated into an active program; thus, the words were doomed to remain a 
collection of ideas recorded, or written on paper. However, the significance of the 
ideological struggle lies in the fact that it conveyed how easily ideology could be 
manipulated in order to mobilize the Arab "street" and certain leaders and 
organizations. One must conclude, therefore, that during the Gulf crisis ideology 
served to justify decisions (usually ex post facto); to acquire legitimacy, power 
and prestige; and to unify the nation. 
The ideological struggle during the Gulf crisis can be analyzed on two levels: 
it may be seen as part of the old Arab quest for power and domination, remimscent 
of rivalries between 'Abdal-Nasir and his Arab opponents during the 1950sandthe 
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1960s; but it may also reflect the psychological pressures, preoccupations and 
aspirations that exist in the Arab society. Geertz claimed that during the decolonization 
era, Third World countries suffered from a "pervasive sense of disorientation:" 
The attainment of independence, the overthrow of established ruling 
classes, the popularization of legitimacy, the rationalization of public 
administration, the rise of modern elites, the spread of literacy and 
mass communications, and the propulsion . . . of inexperienced 
governments into the midst of a precarious international order... all 
make for a pervasive sense of disorientation.... The search for a new 
symbolic framework in terms of which to formulate, think about, and 
react to political problems, whether in the form of nationalism, 
Marxism, liberalism, populism, racism, Caesarism, ecclesiasticism, 
or some variety of reconstructed traditionalism (or, most commonly, 
a confused melange of several of these) [emphasis added] is there-
fore tremendously intense.131 
Based on Geertz's description, the "confused melange" of Arab symbols and 
motifs during the Gulf crisis may be interpreted as an Arab search for a new 
symbolic framework. Such interpretation should be substantiated by further study 
of recent writings by Arab intellectuals. 
The reaction of Arab states to the Gulf crisis revealed that the support of, or 
opposition to, Iraq's policy was mainly divided according to state interests. Yet, 
beyond the state's interests, the crisis led to die crystallization of two schools of 
thought: the Iraqi school derived its strength from religious and secular messages 
of the Islamic-Arab ethos, while expressing disappointment and frustration with the 
West; the Egyptian school recognized the different state interests, defined a new 
meaning of Arab solidarity, and called for pragmatism and cooperation with the 
West in order to solve the economic and social problems of the Arab world. During 
the Arab summit in Cairo President Mubarak asserted that "the Arab nation would 
not become the 'sick man' of this century."132 This metaphor reflected the roots of 
the Arab dilemma; drawn from the Ottoman heritage, when the Empire had been 
called "the sick man on the Bosphorus," it anticipates a better future for the Arabs 
tied, by one way or the other, with the West. It is most tempting to predict that the 
Egyptian school of thought will be victorious. However, such an observation would 
surely be premature at this stage. 
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